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ABSTRACT 
Technological innovation has significantly reduced the time and distance across borders in the 
time of the 21st century. Nowadays more and more ordinary citizens are involved in the 
transnational integration of the world, and the flow of globalization seems to have diminished 
the role of the national state in protecting the legal rights of its citizens. At the same time, 
radical changes, such as immigration and an aging population, are bringing about a structural 
rearrangement in the entire world, with no exception of Asian society. This change suggests 
that the relationship between the state and civil society has become more important than ever. 
From this perspective, the trust relationship within civil society could be seen as an answer to 
socio-political uncertainties, since trust is known to be a key factor in maintaining a stable 
relationship within society. This study examines the conceptual framework of the existing 
literature on trust and citizenship, followed by an empirical study on Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan, countries that share similar development paths and rapid economic growth experiences, 
often described as the “Asian miracle.” Using the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey 
(ABS) from the respective countries, this study statistically verifies the hypotheses via factor 
analysis, chi-square tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests, Pearson’s and Kendall’s 
correlations, binary logistic regression, and multiple linear regression. In conclusion, the 
findings of this study suggest that in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, the level of interpersonal 
and institutional trust is highly correlated with the perception of national value. Also, 
contrasting results suggest that interpersonal trust is expressed in Taiwan as conventional 
citizenship such as voting and active participation, while in Korea and Singapore, this type of 
trust has led to an open attitude towards globalization and immigrant populations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background and Objective 
1. Background 
Technological innovation has significantly reduced the time and distance across borders in the 
time of the 21st century. As a result, resources and ideas between different nations are being 
exchanged more easily and more frequently. Furthermore, faster and cheaper global 
communications have made it easier to organize groups of like minds around the world. At the 
same time, the rapid liberalization of national and international economies, the spread of 
electronic communications and informatization throughout the world have resulted in the 
emergence of a global civil society and a new form of citizenship (Falk 1992). 
As such, global interactions differ from the past in important ways. Nowadays more and more 
ordinary citizens are involved in the transnational integration of the world, while previously it 
was the privilege of the government and the elite (Ferree 2006). Furthermore, in today’s 
ubiquitous world, people can easily exchange opinions and develop the civic competence and 
trust needed to influence politics and public institutions. As a result, the flow of globalization 
seems to have diminished the role of the national state in protecting the legal rights of its 
citizens. 
At the same time, radical changes, such as immigration and the aging population, are bringing 
about a structural rearrangement to the entire world, with no exception of Asian society. This 
change suggests that the relationship between the state and civil society has become more 
important than ever. Given this array of views, it seems worth examining the relationship 
between citizenship and the significance of trust as social capital, which is known to be an 
adhesive function that connects and integrates individuals in society. 
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2. Objective 
Given the above aspects, this study examines the relationship between citizenship and trust. 
Particular attention is paid to the transformation of citizenship in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, 
countries which share similar development paths and rapid economic growth experiences, often 
described as the “Asian miracle.” Using the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) 
from the respective countries, this study attempts to analyze the common characteristics and 
the differences between the selected countries.  
 
B. Scope and Methodology 
1. Subject and scope 
In the second half of the 20th century, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore achieved unprecedented 
economic growth. Up to today, these nations remain the most dynamic economic zones in the 
world. Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita reached 
US$ 87,100, $ 49,500 and $ 37,900 respectively in 2016, ranking 7th, 27th, and 46th among 230 
countries (CIA World Factbook 2017). In addition, the three countries have responded rapidly 
to new technological changes and innovations. Consequently, the household Internet access 
ratio was 98.14% in Korea as of 2015, ranking first among 143 countries worldwide, and 86% 
and 74.9% in Singapore and Taiwan, ranking 11th and 31st (World Economic Forum 2016). 
Furthermore, it is well known that the three countries which share a common cultural influence 
from Confucian tradition show a high educational fervor. According to the Human 
Development Index, Singapore is ranked 5th, Korea 18th, and Taiwan 27th among 188 countries 
worldwide (UNDP 2015, Taiwan National Statistics 2017). Presumably, the human resources 
in these countries have been an important source of this rapid growth.  
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Table 1. Socio-economic indexes 
 
Fertility Net migration Population growth HDI  
Rate Rank Rate Rank Rate Rank Score Rank 
Korea 1.25 220 2.50 37 0.50 153 0.901 18 
Singapore 0.82 224 13.10 6 1.80 60 0.925 5 
Taiwan 1.12 222 0.90 59 0.20 182 0.885 27* 
Total 
countries 
224 222 235 188 
Year 2016 2017 2017 2015 
Source CIA Fact Book CIA Fact Book CIA Fact Book UNDP* 
Notes: The human development index of Taiwan is obtained from the data released by the Taiwan 
National Statistics through its website (http://www.stat.gov.tw). 
 
Meanwhile, one might pose the question of whether the newly emerged civil societies in the 
three nations have contributed to more stable democracies. According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index report (2016), Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are ranked 
25th, 33rd, and 70th among 167 nations. Furthermore, their rank for the freedom of the press is 
far behind. In 2015, Freedom House’s Press Freedom study (2017) reported that Taiwan is 
ranked 63rd, Korea 73rd, and Singapore 159th among 210 countries. Indeed, the democratic 
levels in the three nations seem to be significantly lower than their above-mentioned economic 
and technical progress. Despite economic achievements, each of the three nations is struggling 
with the chronic contradiction between the collectivist political order and its civic role. 
Historically, the frailty of the contractual basis has been observed in Asian society (Chang and 
Turner). Accordingly, Harvey (2006) observes correlation between dictatorship regimes and 
rapid economic growth in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. For example, in Korea, authoritarian 
 
Press Freedom Democracy GDP per capita 
(PPP) 
Households Internet 
access%  
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank % Rank 
Korea 34 73 7.92 25 $37,900  46 98.14 1 
Singapore 67 159 6.38 70 $87,100  7 86 11 
Taiwan 25 63 7.79 33 $49,500  27 74.9 31 
Total 
countries 
210 167 230 143 
Year 2017 2016 2016-17 2015 
Source Freedom House The Economist CIA Fact Book World Economic 
Forum 
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regimes were in power for decades in the latter half of the 20th century. The government backed 
by the military maintained a repressive state until the establishment of the civilian government 
in the early 1990s. Additionally, these three countries are expected to be facing demographic 
transition. In particular, the remarkably low fertility rate is one of the common challenges 
facing all three countries. As of 2016, Singapore had the lowest fertility rate among 224 
countries worldwide, followed by Taiwan at 222nd and Korea at 220th (The CIA World Factbook 
2017). Meanwhile, the population growth rate also remains at a low level. The rapid decline in 
the fertility rate is expected to bring about a serious labor shortage by mid-century. This 
demographic transition would lead to significant changes in the countries’ social structures. 
Plausible solutions could be increasing reliance on migrant labor or outsourcing production to 
other regions around the world. As of 2017, net migration in all three countries recorded 
positive growth, indicating a higher influx population than the outflow (The CIA World 
Factbook 2017). It is therefore highly possible that overseas labor would result in decreased 
domestic jobs while the immigrant population increases, which may become a cause of conflict 
in domestic society. 
Given all the uncertainties of the circumstances and the growing role of the individual citizen 
in international society, the time seems to be right to examine whether each society provides 
the basic elements for a stable and pluralistic democracy. From this perspective, the trust 
relationship within civil society could be seen as an answer to socio-political uncertainties, 
since trust is known to be a key factor in maintaining a stable relationship within society 
(Putnam 1993). In this regard, Pye (1999) explains that the answer requires going beyond the 
existing conceptual framework, and emphasizes an approach based on three related but distinct 
elements: civility, social capital, and civil society. The theoretical background of the civil, 
political and social rights debate could be found in the Western heritage of Thomas Humphrey 
Marshall which emerged within the teleological development of British history. Therefore, it 
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would be necessary to examine the concept of citizenship in the context of East Asian society 
(Holston 2001). Thus far, the above explored social and political contexts, seem to justify the 
choosing of each country as the focus of the study. 
 
2. Methodology 
The introductory chapter explains the background of how citizenship and trust in Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan are taken into account. Each of the subjects of study is handled 
independently in the next chapter. First, Chapter 2 explores the existing literature on the 
formation of trust and the different paradigms on citizenship. Chapter 3 explains the research 
designs and methods used to explore the results of the three countries’ trust types and aspects 
of citizenship. The results of the research analysis are then elaborated in Chapter 4, with an 
examination of the interrelationship between trust and citizenship components and a review of 
how the results were derived. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on a discussion of the research findings. 
This study examines the conceptual framework of the existing literature on trust and citizenship, 
followed by an empirical study on Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Literature Review 
1. Trust 
Trust and function of social capital 
According to the results of the World Value Survey (WVS 2014), conducted in 59 different 
countries from 2010 to 2014, national pride in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan was lower than the 
average total. Furthermore, the aggregate answers in the three countries to the question, “do you 
consider yourself as citizen of the world,” were also at a below average level. Moreover, Koreans 
showed low trust in the government, and Taiwanese had low confidence in the media. However, 
Singaporeans showed a relatively high level of trust in general with a particularly high level of 
trust in the government. In addition, according to the results of the survey, Koreans are skeptical 
about household economy, and the voting rate and trust in foreigners are relatively low. 
Table 2. World Value Survey Results (2010-2014)  
 
General Trust Trust in 
Government 
Trust in 
Television 
Trust in the 
press 
Trust in 
Foreigners  
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Korea 1.27 21 2.44 26 2.68 13 2.65 11 2.13 29 
Singapore 1.37 13 3.01 5 2.68 15 2.67 10 2.47 10 
Taiwan 1.31 18 2.39 30 2.28 42 2.19 42 2.4 15 
Average  1.25 2.41 2.49 2.38 2.15 
Score Scale 2 4 4 4 4 
  
Household 
Economy 
National Vote National Pride I see myself as a 
world citizen  
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Korea 5.69 41 2.4 33 3.13 50 2.99 30 
Singapore 6.41 16 2.56 21 3.36 41 2.89 35 
Taiwan 6.39 17 2.69 12 2.82 58 2.94 31 
Average 5.86 2.4 3.44 3 
Score Scale 9 3 4 4 
 
Source: World Value Survey wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Notes: 1) Survey year: South Korea 2010, Singapore 2012, Taiwan 2012 
2) Wave 6 of the WVS, conducted the survey in a total of 59 countries. 
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In this respect, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports 
that trust is a concept that represents the social capital itself by noting that “Trust is an 
acceptable proxy for social capital in the absence of a wider and more comprehensive set of 
indicators” (Healy et al. 2002). Putnam (1993) maintains that trust is the glue for civic life. 
According to him, social trust comes from the norm of reciprocity and participation. In other 
words, the higher the mutual trust of the community, the higher the probability of cooperation. 
At the same time, a high level of citizen participation and networking leads to a high level of 
generalized trust and reciprocity. Likewise, a large amount of literature has provided positive 
evidence between civic engagement networks and the average level of aggregate trust (Knack 
and Keefer 1997; Stolle and Rochon 2001). 
 
Trust and the structure of social capital 
Nevertheless, several studies have shown no evidence of the hypothesized relationship between 
civic associations and enhanced trust (Häuberer 2011; Newton 2001). The contradictory results 
on the trust and network level can be explained by the structural approach of social capital, 
which draws a distinction between the structure and strength of the network. For example, 
Coleman (1988) claims that trustworthiness develops when social structures are closed, or 
when relationships exist among all subjects. Similarly, Bourdieu (1984) notes that social capital 
grows from the relationship and provides useful support when needed. In Bourdieu’s concept, 
individuals are meant to benefit from the relationship.  
From another perspective, Burt (2015) and Lin (2002) conceptualized social capital with a 
structural model. According to Burt, the network can be either closed or open. If the 
relationship between all actors of the network is maintained, it is considered to be a closed state. 
If this relationship leads to the same information among the same people, then the relationship 
is regarded as overlapping. However, if some members of the network are related to members 
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of another network, the network is open. Consequently, an open network grants the benefits of 
a network to two actors in contact (Burt 2015). In the same vein, Lin defines social capital as 
a resource embedded in social relations. He argues that the closure of a network can have 
negative externalities because non-members of a group cannot access network resources, and  
network members cannot gather new information outside the network (Lin 2002). From 
Coleman’s concept, closed structures cannot maximize social capital, whereas weak ties are 
not maintained. 
As seen in the study by van Staveren and Knorringa (2007) on SMEs in Ethiopia and Vietnam, 
bridging social capital is measured between loosely connected people, so-called general trust. 
Furthermore, bonding social capital is measured from strong ties based on social identities such 
as family, blood relations, gender, or race, which show a particular type of trust associated with 
group members (van Staveren and Knorringa 2007). 
 
Nature of trust 
Putnam (2001) explains that although social trust and political trust are theoretically connected, 
empirically they may or may not be linked. Putnam emphasizes that trust in the government 
may be the cause or result of social trust, but government trust and social trust are not the same. 
Putnam's explanation of the relationship between social trust and political trust is as follows: 
 “Our subject is social trust, not trust in government or other social institutions. Trust in 
other people is logically quite different from trust in institutions and political authorities. 
One could easily trust one’s neighbor and distrust city hall, or vice versa. Empirically, the 
social and political trust may or may not be correlated, but theoretically, they must be kept 
distinct. Trust in government may be a cause or a consequence of social trust, but it is not 
the same thing as social trust (Putnam 2001, 137).” 
Many scholars claim that political trust or institutional trust differ from interpersonal or social 
trust by its nature. Interpersonal and social trust is based on direct contact with close individuals, 
personal life satisfaction (Whiteley 1999), and people in direct social relationships, whereas 
institutional trust is formed mainly by indirect means through mass media (Kaase 1999; 
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Newton 1999). In this study of nine European countries, Kaase (1999) showed that 
interpersonal trust is only weakly associated with political trust, and he concluded that 
interpersonal trust is not a prerequisite for political trust. Accordingly, a number of studies 
suggest that the performance of political institutions has the greatest impact on citizens’ 
political trust. The degree of institutional trust is closely related to the performance of the 
government because political trust depends on a rational assessment of the citizens’ 
institutional performance (Della Porta 2000; Hetherington 1998; Pharr 2000).  
 
2. Citizenship 
Today, we all live in a cosmopolitan era in which interdependence transcends nationality under 
the influence of globalization (Armstrong 2006a). This implies that in the interrelated global 
community, behavior in one part of the planet inevitably affects others (Held and McGrew 
2007). Global civil society is, defined by Armstrong, a place where individuals and groups 
coordinate the conditions of global integration and interdependence. Thus individual rights and 
responsibilities are directly linked. As a result, globalization has expanded the terms of national 
citizenship from citizenship limited to political and economic categories (Armstrong 2006b). 
The origin of “citizenship,” as the relationship between civil society and the state, can be found 
in the ancient city-state of Greece and ancient Rome. In the Greek era, citizenship, a notion 
derived from the Greek word for city (polis), embodied the concept of freedom from the private 
sphere (oikos) to the public domain (police), which enables collective rational and moral 
deliberation. Whereas citizenship in the Roman era set forth the legal rights as a premise, rather 
than political freedom (Shafir 1998; Beiner 1995). In this respect, modern citizenship 
originated from the ancient ideas of citizenship. However, it should be understood apart from 
that of the modern era because the modern notion includes not only the civic duty but also 
political rights (Gowar 2008b). 
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The concept of modern citizenship is largely divided into two approaches, liberal and 
republican, whereas the contemporary debate on citizenship is divided into liberal, 
communitarian, and socio-cultural approaches. 
 
Modern citizenship between liberal and republican approaches 
In the liberal tradition, citizenship is regarded as a rights-based legal status, whereas the 
republican tradition emphasizes citizen participation. Fundamental to liberal thought is a 
rationally acting individual for the pursuit of one’s interests, while, the role of the state is to 
protect citizens to exercise citizens’ rights (Oldfield 1990). From the perspective of liberal 
theorists, citizenship is equivalent to formal membership of the nation-state, establishing an 
identity that promotes the equality of rights and obligations. As such, from the liberal 
perspective, the right to vote constitutes a priority form of participation for a democratic system 
(Jones and Gaventa 2002). Notably, the right of participation has long been a key concept of 
liberal thought, which implies a comprehensive right to political participation, but the exercise 
of rights is considered optional on the premise that citizens have the necessary resources and 
opportunities (Isin and Wood 1999).  
However, it is important to note that basic rights, such as the freedom of expression and the 
equality of all individuals, were not established until the 19th and 20th centuries (Marshall 1964; 
Crotty 2017). During post-World War II England, Marshal expanded the concept of modern 
citizenship analysis. He denotes that “citizenship is a status given to those who become full 
members, having equal rights and duties imposed” (Bottomore 1992). Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that Marshall understands citizenship as civil, political, and social rights. In 
conceptualizing citizenship and civil identity, he includes social rights in addition to existing 
politics and civic rights (Marshall 1950).  
For liberal scholars, it is natural that citizenship as a practice and identity is bound to the 
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institution of the state. Therefore, Rawls (1971) sees citizens as being capable of understanding 
justice and the concepts of right and wrong, and of creating a free and equal society. He claims 
that citizens should have equal rights to participate and make decisions in the constitutional 
procedures while being devoted members of the community. In this array of views, Turner 
(1993) understands the notion of citizenship as the totality of legal, political, economic, and 
cultural practices of a competent member of society who is able to determine the flow of 
resources to people and social groups. 
However, there are counter-arguments from republican scholars who claim that state freedom 
and personal freedom cannot be separated, because the will of the citizens determines that of 
society. In contrast to the liberal concept that emphasizes the rights of individuals, the 
republicans highlight the political nature of people and see citizenship as an active activity 
rather than a passive one (Delanty 2003). The main characteristic of the republican view is 
democratic citizenship based on active participation; thereby it is also referred to as “citizen-
republicanism.” Moreover, the republican approach emphasizes the moral, formal, and legal 
dimensions beyond the liberalist viewpoint. In this regard, Tully (2009) makes a distinction 
between “civil” and “civic” citizenship, by describing “civil citizens” as the status of persons 
who are at liberty, whereas “civic citizens,” are seen as active participants. From this view, he 
defines civic freedom as manifestation and participation, and civic rights as products of civic 
activity. 
 
Contemporary citizenship: communitarian and socio-cultural approaches 
Communitarian approach 
The social-centric citizenship model’s tradition lies within the perspective of Tocqueville. 
Tocqueville, who studied the United States in the 1830s, viewed civic engagement not only as 
a duty to public life but also as a personal reward, and as such, people in a democracy are 
 12 
 
connected and develop as individuals. Tocqueville points out that the center that enhances trust 
and community solidarity is within civil society rather than the state or public institutions. 
Accordingly, Tocqueville emphasized that the vitality of democracy lies in the solidarity of 
associations such as voluntary groups, and organizations (Tocqueville 1966; Stolle and Rochon 
2001). 
More recently, the republican tradition has been largely represented by communitarianism 
(Delanty 2007). The issue of identity has been raised in the debate on citizens’ rights, and the 
concept of the individual is substituted by the community, considering it as a key axis of 
citizenship (Walzer 1995). According to Walzer, communitarians claim that citizens require 
necessary rights in order to participate in a proper institutional environment for the sake of 
sociability itself. He also notes that if the state is completely revoted from civil society, the 
state cannot survive and that the two parties interacting in complementary ways are 
indispensable (Walzer 1995). Likewise, Oldfield (1990) claims that citizenship is not about 
altruism, but about recognizing community goals as their own, choosing for oneself and 
dedicating them to the community.  
Republican and communitarian theorists argue that the area of citizenship remains at the 
national level. However, the process of globalization altered the meaning of national citizens. 
In this respect, other scholars advocating a cosmopolitan position acknowledge that the state is 
no longer an exclusive political unit regarding citizenship (Holston 2001). Likewise, nowadays, 
the concept of citizenship based on a state-centered approach has become difficult to apply to 
other social groups such as ethnic minorities and migrants. 
 
Socio-cultural approach 
Some scholars have seen that the real challenge in the future will be to bring about the idea of 
inclusion of different ethnic groups. In this sense, they propose the concept of “cultural 
citizenship” as an expanded concept replacing the existing multiculturalism (Pakulski 1997; 
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Turner 2001). Thus far, societies have often used symbolic boundaries around their members 
based on their place of birth, relationship, class, ethnicity, race, gender, religion, a boundary 
that would define insiders and outsiders, rights and obligations (Baker and Shryock 2009). 
Hence, discussions on “cultural citizenship” inevitably imply a social transition, conflicting 
political agendas, and ideologies. From a similar standpoint, Shelat (2014) claims that the 
concept of “transcultural” citizenship better represents the concept of modern citizenship 
compared to “global” citizenship since interactions between other cultures are more often based 
on interpersonal relationships with horizontal communications, rather than legal-political, 
institutional governance. 
  
Cosmopolitan citizenship: globally oriented citizens 
Confronted by the free economy that threatens the sovereignty of the state and the rapid growth 
of immigration, globalization seems to erode the existing national boundaries. As a 
consequence, it is widely accepted that the globalization process has a significant influence on 
the practice and theory of citizenship (Heisler 2001; Sassen 2002). Thereupon, theoretical 
discussions are being conducted on the role of the individual and the influence of globalization 
on political participation.  
Scholars such as Nussbaum (1996) have argued for the resurgence of global citizens. Many 
scholars agree that a broader definition of citizenship, traditionally understood as a unit of 
rights, duties, participation, and identity, which meets the modern international context (Beck 
and Ritter 1998; Giddens 1990) is required. Other scholars even argued that people need to 
institutionalize the idea of today’s global citizenship (Falk 1995; Held 1995). Nevertheless, for 
Nussbaum (1996) world politics are not a precondition for global citizenship. She uses the term 
“world citizenship” by emphasizing the moral category of world citizenship and the role of 
education, for whom world citizenship is seen as a realm of sentiment, but not a political 
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category. She argues that personal behavior as a global citizen does not require state institutions, 
and underlines the role of educators to break down barriers between different nationalities and 
ethnic groups, to develop a community of global dialogue and interest. Meanwhile, Delanty 
(2007) argues that a wider concept of citizenship is solicited to understand the challenges of 
globalization. Delanty thus uses the term “cosmopolitan” citizenship. He argues that 
cosmopolitan citizenship is not just an additional kind of citizenship, but an inclusive idea of 
all forms of citizenship. In this regard, the sociological notion of “cultural citizenship” 
emphasizes crossing multicultural diversity borders within national society and reaching new 
sphere of identity and belonging.  
The universality of the global citizen, namely cultural or cosmopolitan citizenship, is often 
perceived as a contradictory concept of “state” and “state citizenship” (Armstrong 2006a). In 
this regard, controversies converge on two major issues: the first is the lack of global 
governance; the second is the problem of global citizens being rootless nomads (Zolo and 
Rubenstein 2003). Critical communitarians argue that the cosmopolitan approach 
underestimates the power and function of the state (Walzer 1996; Miller 1999). 
Communitarians and republicans also point out that global democracy itself is neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary condition for effective international cooperation. The issue is thereby 
developing and encouraging citizens to be politically aware, in order to contribute to the 
country's vision (Slaughter 2005) more cooperatively.  
While developing a heated discussion of the political identity of global citizenship, some are 
adversely affected by globalization and have turned towards “territorial citizenship” and 
defensive patriotism (Falk 1989). After all, as Zolo points out, globalization may not bring 
about global cultural homogenization. The movement of wealth, information, science, and 
technology affects the labor force by exacerbating the gap between the wealthy and the have-
nots (Zolo 2003). 
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As an alternative, some scholars suggest new approaches that embody citizenship at the local, 
national, and transnational levels (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Gowar 2008a). For instance, 
Armstrong (2006a) observed that despite the claim to the discourse of global citizenship, 
certain parts of citizenship remain resolutely “non-global” and notes that “national sovereignty” 
and citizenship are not “internationalized.” He notes that the current world order consists of 
“global” capital, goods, information and human rights, but responsibility for such issues as 
poverty, development and human rights remains limited at the state level. Thereby, Armstrong 
suggests that what best characterizes today’s world can be the coexistence of various 
citizenship and not a transition from state to international citizenship. 
In addition, Parekh (2003) has proposed “globally oriented citizens” referring to those who 
recognize the reality and value of the political community, and who pursue the political 
community. In the same vein, he suggested using the notion “internationalism” instead of 
“cosmopolitanism.” For Parekh, globally oriented citizens not only seeks “internationalism” 
but also patriotism, rootedness in one’s society and openness to others, and maintains a balance 
between conflicting values (Parekh 2003). In brief, discussions of alternative citizenship 
suggest that citizenship identity has become increasingly more flexible and relational. 
 
Asian countries: developmental citizenship 
According to Lucian W. Pye (1999), all societies have their own rules about civility, which 
forms an integrated functional society and prevents confusion, disorder, and anarchy. 
Conceivably, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have been the subject of several comparisons 
because of their shared history of Japanese occupation, the timing of their industrial 
development, and the similarity of the state’s intervention in their economic policies. The 
developmental agenda which intervenes with economic planning by promoting export-led 
industrialization has been regarded as the catalyst for this growth in this region (Park 2004). 
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The three countries also share the background of Confucian cultural heritage. Regarding this 
background, Turner (2012) points out the shortcomings of the Confucian tradition which has 
been an important constraint on the development of participatory citizenship in Asia, and which 
has made citizens conform to the social order, rather engaging as social citizens (Chang and 
Turner 2012).  
Many scholars argue that citizenship in East Asia should be understood differently from 
Marshall’s definition or Western “social citizenship.” For instance, Turner (2012), in this regard, 
draws a distinction between social citizenship and national citizenship. He defines national 
citizenship as a political identity for the construction of the nation, based on nationalism. He 
also notes that national citizenship is more related to creating exclusive boundaries and political 
identities. Furthermore, Williams uses the term “low-quality democracy” or semi-democracy  
to illustrate many Asian societies’ compliant populations, authoritarian norms, and relatively 
subservient elite groups, which are seemingly the legacies of communism, anti-colonial wars, 
and civil war (Williams 2003). In addition, to elucidate the above characteristics of Asian 
citizenship in contrast to European social citizenship, Chang (2012) uses the terms 
“developmental citizenship.” He observes the practice of citizenship in East Asia with a focus 
on South Korea and claims that the main concern of both national elites and ordinary citizens 
has mostly focused on economic development and material pursuits, rather than civil liberties. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the original assumption of Western liberalism was that, in the 
long run, competitive capitalism would enhance individual rights. However, this assumption 
has been revised as corporate capitalism, globalization and financial domination continued 
growing. Instead, relatively low wages, minimum welfare and harsh working conditions have 
been imposed in favor of rapid economic growth and world competitiveness (Chang 2012). 
Nonetheless, one may easily assume that the difference between Western and Asian citizenship 
may become less and less important, as globalization today has a direct impact on the world 
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economy and global capitalism. Yet, in the famous 1993 essay on the clash of civilizations, 
Samuel Huntington claimed that from a Western perspective, there would be a world of other 
civilizations rather than a universal civilization in the relevant future (Huntington 1993). In the 
same vein, Chang and Turner maintain that globalization did not bring about a set of 
cosmopolitan values, but on the contrary, the restoration of nationalism. They, therefore, 
question whether the rights, values, and institutions that underpin citizenship can survive with 
these monumental social and political transitions (Chang and Turner 2012). 
In the 21st century, where globalization and trans-nationalization continue to accelerate, civil 
society and enhanced citizenship are essential for the valid implementation of the democratic 
world. Composed of various independent interest groups and citizens who are able to exert 
pressure on the state, civil society is expected to be a stepping-stone to the next step leading to 
the development of a democratic political culture in a boundless world. In short, by comparing 
South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, it is expected to broaden the scope of the study and reveal 
important insights that would improve the understanding of the subject matter. 
 
Measurement criteria for citizenship 
For empirical analysis, this study examines the central components of citizenship in the 21st 
century, as identified through quantitative studies. These studies have shown the importance of 
empirical analysis that provides quantitative guidelines to better understand the evolution of 
different communities. 
Firstly, a report by the Commonwealth Foundation and CIVICUS (1999) summarizes the 
findings of its research, which explored how citizens perceive their citizenship, based on 
answers collected from thousands of citizens from 47 Commonwealth countries. The study 
found that expected citizens are those who: (1) fulfill basic needs; (2) form associations with 
other people (with respect to culture and heritage, cooperation, caring, and sharing in the 
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community/society); and (3) participate in the governance of society for the pursuit of equal 
rights and justice, and responsive governance.  
Also, Helmut Anheier (2001) examined the feasibility of developing a Global Civil Society 
Index, with the aim of establishing a set of indicators that measure global civil society. In this 
study, the basic unit of analysis for a global civil society is categorized into two different 
segments: organizational infrastructure, and individual participation and identity. The latter, 
“individual participation and identity” consists of indicators of: (1) social and political 
participation; (2) cosmopolitan values; and (3) identity (belonging). 
Lastly, it would also be helpful to examine, theoretically connected citizenship criteria from a 
psycho-sociology study. For example, W. Lance Bennett, Chris Wells, and Deen Freelon (2011) 
define a different type of “actualizing citizenship” from the traditional “dutiful citizenship,” 
which is declining among younger generations, particularly in the United States. The suggested 
“actualizing citizenship” model is a form of personal involvement that maximizes the 
representation of individuals by using peer group networks and social technologies, away from 
the interest of public authorities. The traits of two different models are distinctly described as 
follows:  
•  Actualizing Citizenship 
̶ Oriented around citizen input to the government or formal public 
organizations, institutions, and campaigns 
̶ Rooted in responsibility and duty 
̶ Channeled through membership in defined social groups 
•  Dutiful Citizenship 
̶ Open to many forms of creative civic input, ranging from government to 
consumer politics to global activism 
̶ Rooted in self-actualization through social expression 
̶ Personal interests channeled through loosely tied networks 
(Bennett, Wells, and Freelon 2011, 838–40) 
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3. Previous empirical studies 
Empirical studies using multilevel survey analysis of trust and social participation are realized 
in various academic fields. The central areas of research are the classification of trust types, the 
association between institutional trust and social participation, and government efficiency. In 
addition, several studies have examined the trust characteristics of Asian countries. Some key 
empirical research examples, methodologies, and results are discussed in the following. 
Firstly, some studies claim that trust is the most important factor for government efficiency and 
life satisfaction, among various elements of social capital. For example, Christian Bjørnskov 
(2007) examined cross-country data from three different waves of the World Value Survey 
(WVS 1990–2001) to identify Putnam’s claim on social capital. Bjørnskov divided social 
capital into three components according to Putnam's definition, which corresponds to social 
trust, social norms, and coalitions. He then concluded that trust alone influenced governance 
and life satisfaction. 
Another study shows that social trust and political trust are not always related to one another, 
and should be considered different elements. In this regard, Kenneth Newton (2001) examined 
plausible relations between social trust and political trust based on the WVS (1991–95) from 
44 nations, the result of which suggests that high levels of social trust are associated with high 
levels of political trust, and vice versa. Meanwhile, he also found that political trust and social 
trust have a commonality in many respects, but that they are also different in other respects. 
Social or personal trust is formed by immediate and direct experiences with others, but political 
trust is usually formulated indirectly through the media. Therefore, he admits that there are 
some exceptions to the general rules. The causal factor he defines is the efficiency of social 
and political institutions that influence the association between individual trust and political 
trust. 
Other scholars have examined the relationship between social participation and trust with 
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governance and economic performance. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1997), for example, 
obtained results that are consistent with Putnam’s theory. In an analysis of trust and indicators 
of civic norms from the WVS realized in 29 countries, they found that societies with greater 
trust tend to show better government economic performance. They confirmed that trust and 
citizenship norms are stronger in population groups that have a relatively equal and high-
income level, better education, and homogeneous ethnicity. Importantly, however, they also 
found that memberships in the formal groups, which is one of Putnam’s critical measurements 
of social capital, is not related to trust or a high level of economic performance. 
Lastly, a more recent social capital study of citizenship and democracy in Asian countries by 
Kwang-Il Yoon, and Chong-Min Park (2017) shows interesting results. This research based on 
the fourth wave data of the ABS of 13 East Asian countries explored the implications of social 
capital in East Asia for citizens’ attitudes toward political engagement and the quality of 
governance. Through a multilevel analysis, they found that bridging group membership does 
not increase political involvement, such as an interest in politics, news consumption, and 
discussion of political issues, while generalized trust shows a positive relationship. Further, it 
has been found that the influence of Confucian tradition tends to inhibit political participation, 
suggesting that the citizens belonging to societies built on Confucian culture are rather allegiant 
to the social rules. 
 
B. Scope and Limitations 
A vast array of socio-political studies have examined the nature and scope of citizens in a global 
society, drawing on normative concepts from different paradigms. However, only a few studies 
have addressed the constituent elements of analysis or methods of analysis of the subject. The 
conceptual approach alone can make it difficult to identify the actual manifestation of the 
citizenry in different backgrounds and to understand possible causal relationships with other 
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determinants of the society. 
Furthermore, a great amount of literature focuses on the causal factors of social trust or the 
positive influence of institutional trust, but there are relatively few studies on interpersonal 
trust or international trust. Admittedly, interpersonal or international level approaches may be 
difficult to apply to social studies because both relationships reside either beneath or beyond 
the national boundaries. Nonetheless, from the previous studies, it is claimed that trust is 
manifested in significantly different ways depending on the cultural background. It is also 
shown that the effect of trust varies depending on the subject of trust. Many scholars suggest 
that as an element of social capital, strong trust among the specific group members can induce 
collective exclusiveness towards outside non-members. As such, trust could become a serious 
cause of conflict when applied to globalizing society, and especially in a society, where a strong 
inner-group relationship is prevalent.  
In this respect, this study attempts to analyze not only the positive impacts on the manifestation 
of citizenship but also the negative influences of trust and its constituents. In the following part 
of this study, hypotheses and relevant variables will be established based on the implications 
from the above literature and previous studies.  
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III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
A. Analysis Model 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between trust and citizenship in Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan in the context of globalization. In order to examine the relationship 
between social capital and citizenship, the implications from the literature and previous studies 
are reflected upon. Thus, the components of trust and citizenship are itemized into different 
components. Trust is divided into three elements, namely institutional and interpersonal trust, 
and that of the media. Citizenship is set to electoral participation, active participation, national 
value, cosmopolitan value, and tolerance for immigration. Gender, age, educational 
background, household economy, and the use of the Internet are included in control variables. 
The research model is as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Analysis Model 
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B. Hypotheses 
Based on the above discussion, this study examines the relationship between trust and 
citizenship, taking account of the socio-economic factors of the three Asian countries. Specific 
research questions addressed in this study and relevant hypotheses are discussed in the 
followings. 
The first research question is whether trust can be divided into three categories, namely, 
institutional trust, interpersonal trust, and trust in the media. In the previous studies, theorists 
explained that institutional trust is distinct from interpersonal trust, so-called social trust or 
general trust (Kaase 1999; Newton 1999; Putnam 2001; Whiteley 1999). Moreover, it seems 
important to recognize the function of the media as serving as the medium for institutional trust, 
given the fact that people generally form their trust toward institutions indirectly through mass 
media (Newton 2001). Assumedly, trust in the media could be categorized as another type of 
trust. 
H1: Interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and trust in the media affect the manifestation of 
citizenship in a distinct manner. In other words, interpersonal trust, institutional trust and 
trust in the media are all different forms of trust that they are mutually independent. 
The second research question concerns whether the function of trust could be applied not only 
at the national level but also at the global level, and how citizenship differs in each case. In this 
regard, while republicans and communitarians emphasize the role of the state within the 
boundaries of the state and citizens’ active participation (Miller 1999; Oldfield 1990; Slaughter 
2005; Tully 2009; Walzer 1995, 1996), some scholars maintain that the “world’s citizens” do 
not presuppose a framework of national institutions (Nussbaum 1996; Shelat 2014). Meanwhile, 
other scholars alternatively suggest that the coexistence of various types of citizenship is 
possible (Armstrong 2006a), globally oriented citizens not only require “internationalism” but 
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also patriotism, rootedness in one’s society and openness to others, and a sense of balance 
between conflicting values (Parekh 2003). From the alternative citizenship argument, this study 
investigates the impact of three types of trust and examines how citizenship appears in national 
and international contexts, with the assumption that the coexistence of national and global 
citizenship is possible. In accordance with the republican and communitarian approaches that 
limit citizenship within the national realm, this study will examine whether citizenship at 
national-level is influenced by institutional trust and trust in the media. On the contrary, in 
accordance with Nussbaum (1996)’s assertion that the national institution is not a precondition 
of “world citizens,” this study will investigate whether interpersonal trust is correlated with 
global-level citizenship, assuming networks are bound to be based on the trust between non-
state actors, beyond institutional intervention. Consequently, the following hypotheses have 
been formulated: 
H2: Institutional trust and trust in the media are positively related to national citizenship 
(electoral participation, political and social participation, national value). 
H3: Interpersonal trust positively influences citizenship related to globalization (cosmopolitan 
value and tolerance for immigrant population). 
Thirdly, given the fact that all three countries have experienced rapid socioeconomic transitions 
over the last century, this study assumes that age groups will show marked differences in the 
value of citizenship, indicating a rapid change in the concept of citizenship from one generation 
to the other. In other words, the influence from the tradition of Confucianism would appear 
more strongly in the elderly group, who have a relatively higher duty and loyalty to the nation, 
than younger generations who are more open to the global environment. Regarding the 
generation gap, the following hypothesis has been elaborated. 
H4: All three countries will show considerable differences in age-based trust and citizenship. 
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Additionally, the study by Knack and Keefer (1997) indicates that societies with greater trust 
tend to show better economic performance, and a high-income economy leads to a high level 
of trust. Moreover, another study claims that prejudice towards outgroups increases if 
competition in the labor market is prevalent, whereas competition for scarce resources 
increases collective conflict (Burns and Gimpel 2000). Therefore, this study will test whether 
citizens who are more satisfied with their household economic conditions are more likely to be 
satisfied with other members of society and show higher trust towards others. 
H5: The level of overall household economy satisfaction is positively related to the overall 
level of trust and tolerance for immigrants. 
Lastly, in the previous studies, Bennett et al. (2011) differentiated the “actualizing citizenship” 
from the traditional “dutiful citizenship.” According to them, “actualizing citizens” focus on 
the representation of individuals through the greater use of peer group networks and social 
technologies, with less regard for public authorities. Further, In line with Burt's “structural hole” 
theory (Burt 2015), this study will examine whether members at the linking point of new 
information are likely to be more open to the outside world. 
H6: The level of education and use of the Internet positively influence citizenship related to 
globalization (cosmopolitan value and tolerance towards immigrants) 
 
C. Measurement of Variables 
1. Trust: independent variables 
As the previous literature claim, trust is a factor that generates more integrated societies. 
Accordingly, if trust promotes social norms, and coalitions (Putnam 1993; Bjørnskov 2007), it 
can also be assumed that trust will have a positive impact on citizenship. To measure this 
possible impact, trust is divided into three components as follows: 
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Institutional trust 
Many scholars claim that individuals tend to hold opinions about the trustworthiness of abstract 
systems, and institutional trust is different to interpersonal trust by its nature. Therefore, 
institutional trust is measured by asking, if the respondent has trust in (1) president; (2) court; 
(3) national government; (4) Political parties; (5) Parliament; (6) Civil service; (7) The military; 
(8) The police.  
 
Trust in the media 
This study separated trust in the media from institutional trust components. In the latter part of 
this study, it is statistically proven that trust in the media is distinct from other governmental, 
legislative institutions. Further, as per Newton (2001) who mentioned that political trust is 
usually learned indirectly through the media, this study presumes that trust in the media to be 
a link between interpersonal and institutional trust. Therefore, trust in the media is measured 
by asking, if the respondent has trust in (1) Newspapers; (2) Television.  
 
Interpersonal trust 
Interpersonal trust refers to trust between people personally known to each other, including 
generalized trust beyond the boundaries of acquaintances (Stolle and Rochon 2001). Although 
social capital theory generally makes a distinction between interpersonal and generalized trust 
because of the difference in the strength of the relationships, a precise distinction between these 
two elements of trust is still a matter of debate. Likewise, in the latter part of this study, it is 
analytically proven that interpersonal trust and general trust are statistically not distinct from 
each other. Interpersonal trust is measured, including the typical “general trust” question, (1) 
“most people can be trusted,” with other questions on (2) trust in relatives; (3) neighbors; (4) 
Other interacting people. 
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2. Citizenship: dependent variables 
Electoral participation 
Voting is one of the most important rights of every citizen and an indicator of a healthy 
democracy. Moreover, according to Putnam, higher levels of social trust increase voter turnout 
and political participation rates (Putnam, 1995). “Electoral participation(voting)” is a dummy 
variable with value 1 for voter and value 0 for abstainer. 
 
Active participation 
According to social capital theories the higher the level of mutual trust in a community, the 
higher the probability of cooperation and participation (Putnam 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Stolle and Rochon 2001). “Active participation” is measured by aggregating questions, (1) Did 
you attend a campaign meeting or rally?; (2) Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain 
candidate or party? ; (3) Did you do anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate? ; 
(4) Whether you personally have ever got together with others to try to resolve local problems ; 
(5)  Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition ; (6) Attended a demonstration 
or protest march 
 
National Value 
Falk (2000) claimed that political identity is shifting away from the nation-state towards 
notions of “global citizenship,” and many adversely develop a stronger sense of territorial 
citizenship and defensive patriotism. Accordingly, “National Value” is measured by 
aggregating questions, (1) Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government; (2) 
Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other 
countries.; (3) Thinking in general, I am proud of being a citizen of my country. 
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Cosmopolitan value 
For Nussbaum (1996), “world citizens” are those who are capable of breaking the barriers 
between distinct nationalities and ethnic groups. Furthermore, from the communitarian 
perspective, Slaughter (2005) claimed that citizens of democratic states are politically aware 
and cooperative concerning their efforts at creating responsive international institutions in a 
globalizing context. Therefore, “Cosmopolitan Value” is measured by aggregating questions: 
(1) How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world; (2) Which of the 
following statement do you agree; "Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top 
priority" and "Protecting the environment should be given priority"; (3) Given the chance, how 
willing would you be to go and live in another country?  
 
Immigration 
The theoretical literature indicates that trust prospers in homogeneous settings (Uslaner 2002), 
and citizens with a pessimistic view of the economic situation will be less open to the 
immigration issues (Herreros and Criado 2009; Giles and Hertz 1994; Oliver and Mendelberg 
2000). Tolerance for “immigration” is measured by aggregating questions: Do you agree that 
the government should increase the inflow of foreign immigrants into the country? 
 
3. Control variables 
To control the effect of the hypothesis on citizenship, the three variables associated with a given 
condition are set as control variables. 
 
Household economy 
In order to explore the impact of household economy performance, individuals’ level of 
satisfaction with their household economic situation was measured by asking a single question, 
“Regarding your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today?” 
with a range from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). 
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Use of the Internet 
The Internet has become a tool so that people all over the world can connect to one another 
without any physical link. This study assumes that the Internet plays a significant role in 
shaping citizenship by forming like-minded networks and global connections, and by keeping 
communication more flexible. In order to explore the impact of online communication on trust 
and citizenship, the frequency of “Internet” use is measured by asking the question: “How often 
do you use the Internet?” with a range from 1 (Never) to 5 (More than a few hours a day). 
 
Socio-demographic Determinants 
The following determinants are examined to find whether there is any demographic differences 
that could explain civic attitude in the three different countries: (1) gender; (2) age; and (3) 
education. 
 
D. Questionnaires 
Based on the aforementioned speculations and research questions, a set of questions selected 
from the fourth wave of Asian Barometer Survey is as follows: 
Table 3. Questionnaires 
Questionnaire Answer 
SE2: Gender 1: Male 
2: Female 
SE3: Age (in decades) 1: 20s 
2: 30s 
3: 40s 
4: 50s 
5: Elder than 60s 
SE5: Education 1: Up to middle school 
2: Up to high school 
3: Up to university or college school 
4: More than graduate school 
Q04: As for your own family, how do you rate the economic 
situation of your family today? 
1: Very bad 
2: Bad 
3: Not-good not-bad 
4: Good 
5: Very good 
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Questionnaire Answer 
Q49: How often do you use the Internet? 1: Never 
2: Less than once a week 
3: Less than a half hour a day 
4: Few hours a day 
5: More than a few hours a day 
Q07: Trust in - The President 1: None at all 
2: Not very much trust 
3: Quite a lot of trust 
4: A great deal of trust 
Q08: Trust in - The courts 
Q09: Trust in - The national government 
Q10: Trust in - Political parties 
Q11: Trust in - Parliament 
Q12: Trust in - Civil service 
Q13: Trust in - The military 
Q14: Trust in - The police 
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers 
Q17: Trust in - Television 
Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy? 
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives 
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors 
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with 
Q33. Did you vote in the last national election? Yes or No 
Q35. Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally? 
Q36. Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain 
candidate or party? 
Q37. Did you do anything else to help out or work for a party 
or candidate? 
Q74. Whether you personally have ever got together with 
others to try to resolve local problems 
1: I have not done this, and I would not do it 
regardless of the situation 
2: I have not done this, but I might do it if 
something important happens in the future 
3: I have done this once 
4: I have done this more than once 
Q75. Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a 
petition 
Q76. Attended a demonstration or protest march 
Q84. Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of 
government 
1: Strongly disagree 
2: Disagree 
3: Agree 
4: Strongly agree 
Q151. Our country should defend our way of life instead of 
becoming more and more like other countries. 
Q161. Thinking in general, I am proud of being a citizen of 
my country? 
Q150. How closely do you follow major events in foreign 
countries/ the world? 
1: Not at all 
2: Very little 
3: Not too closely 
4: Somewhat closely 
5: Very closely 
Q154. Which of the following statement do you agree?: 
"Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top 
priority" and "Protecting the environment should be given 
priority." 
1: Economic growth 
2: Protecting environment 
Q162. Given the chance, how willing would you be to go and 
live in another country 
1: Not willing at all 
2: Not willing 
3: Willing 
4: Very willing 
Q153. Do you agree that the government should increase the 
inflow of foreign immigrants into the country? 
1: Strongly disagree 
2: Disagree 
3: Agree 
4: Strongly agree 
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E. Data 
1. Source of data 
This study analyzes data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Since 
the first survey from 2001 to 2003 for eight East Asian countries, each wave of the ABS has 
been conducted in approximately every four years. The fourth wave was conducted in 14 Asian 
countries from 2014 to 2016. The surveys used in this study were realized from June to 
November 2014 in Taiwan, from October to December 2014 in Singapore, and from October 
to December 2015 in Korea, respectively. The original sample size of ABS data is 1,200 from 
Korea, 1,039 for Singapore, and 1,657 for Taiwan. However, after eliminating cases with 
missing variables, a total of 908 cases are used in the analysis of Korea, 490 and 1,075 cases 
for Singapore and Taiwan respectively. Table 4 below describes the number of counts and the 
corresponding ratio on for answer from five socio-demographic questions. 
 
2. Data analysis 
In subsequent analyses, to verify the hypotheses, socio-demographic elements are first 
analyzed based on descriptive statistics. Consequently, the independent variables and 
dependent variables are examined, via factor analysis, chi-square tests, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) tests, and Pearson’s and Kendall’s correlations. Accordingly, the relationship 
between independent variables and dependent variables is identified, using binary logistic 
regression and multiple linear regression. Finally, the results of six hypotheses and relevant 
findings are addressed.  
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IV. RESULTS 
A. Socio-demographic Variables and Basic Statistics 
Table 4. Socio-Demographic and Use of the Internet 
Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
Total 
(N=2473) 
Counts Ratio Counts Ratio Counts Ratio Counts Ratio 
Gender Male 444 48.9 264 53.9 574 53.4 1282 51.8 
Female 464 51.1 226 46.1 501 46.6 1191 48.2 
Total 908 100.0 490 100.0 1075 100.0 2473 100.0 
Age 20s 130 14.3 117 23.9 159 14.8 406 16.4 
30s 170 18.7 122 24.9 249 23.2 541 21.9 
40s 202 22.2 131 26.7 244 22.7 577 23.3 
50s 190 20.9 75 15.3 229 21.3 494 20.0 
Over 60s 216 23.8 45 9.2 194 18.0 455 18.4 
Total 908 100.0 490 100.0 1075 100.0 2473 100.0 
Level of 
Education 
Middle school 46 5.1 43 8.8 105 9.8 194 7.8 
High school 501 55.2 210 42.9 603 56.1 1314 53.1 
University/College 354 39.0 212 43.3 259 24.1 825 33.4 
Graduate school 7 .8 25 5.1 108 10.0 140 5.7 
Total 908 100.0 490 100.0 1075 100.0 2473 100.0 
Household 
Economy 
Very bad 39 4.3 7 1.4 32 3.0 78 3.2 
Bad 293 32.3 31 6.3 144 13.4 468 18.9 
So-so 518 57.0 209 42.7 428 39.8 1155 46.7 
Good 57 6.3 199 40.6 462 43.0 718 29.0 
Very good 1 .1 44 9.0 9 .8 54 2.2 
Total 908 100.0 490 100.0 1075 100.0 2473 100.0 
Use of 
the 
Internet 
Never 118 13.0 15 3.1 176 16.4 309 12.5 
Once a week 150 16.5 50 10.2 142 13.2 342 13.8 
30 min/day 163 18.0 45 9.2 88 8.2 296 12.0 
1~2 hours/day 148 16.3 96 19.6 174 16.2 418 16.9 
Over 2 hours/day 329 36.2 284 58.0 495 46.0 1108 44.8 
Total 908 100.0 490 100.0 1075 100.0 2473 100.0 
 
Table 4 describes the number of counts and the corresponding ratio for each answer from five 
socio-demographic questions. Detailed questionnaires can be found in Table 3.  
Notably, the distribution of gender and age in each country is identical and equal in general. 
The levels of education in Taiwan and Singapore are slightly higher compared to Korea. Also, 
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the people in Korea estimate their household economy pessimistically, which is not the case in 
Taiwan and Singapore. Additionally, in accordance with the result in Table 3, the Internet use 
rate is quite high in all three countries, as most of the people use the Internet more than two 
hours a day. 
 
B. Independent Variables: Trust 
1. Descriptive analysis in each country 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires on trust in each country 
Questionnaire 
(4 scale) 
Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
Total 
(N=2473) 
Q07: Trust in - The President 2.46 
(.793) 
2.98 
(.716) 
2.08 
(.736) 
2.40 
(.825) 
Q08: Trust in - The courts 2.35 
(.726) 
3.10 
(.635) 
2.13 
(.688) 
2.40 
(.780) 
Q09: Trust in - The national government 2.13 
(.743) 
3.06 
(.725) 
2.17 
(.642) 
2.33 
(.786) 
Q10: Trust in - Political parties 1.89 
(.694) 
2.76 
(.768) 
1.84 
(.623) 
2.04 
(.769) 
Q11: Trust in - Parliament 1.74 
(.723) 
2.94 
(.723) 
1.97 
(.656) 
2.08 
(.824) 
Q12: Trust in - Civil service 2.37 
(.679) 
2.99 
(.725) 
2.38 
(.664) 
2.50 
(.724) 
Q13: Trust in - The military 2.45 
(.723) 
3.04 
(.710) 
2.37 
(.750) 
2.53 
(.775) 
Q14: Trust in - The police 2.52 
(.711) 
3.06 
(.729) 
2.54 
(.702) 
2.64 
(.741) 
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers 2.55 
(.722) 
2.56 
(.777) 
2.10 
(.667) 
2.36 
(.745) 
Q17: Trust in - Television 2.60 
(.722) 
2.56 
(.753) 
2.14 
(.678) 
2.39 
(.743) 
Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy? 2.64 
(.642) 
2.60 
(.791) 
2.71 
(.580) 
2.66 
(.651) 
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives 3.09 
(.612) 
3.13 
(.745) 
3.1 
(.654) 
3.11 
(.658) 
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors 2.72 
(.632) 
2.57 
(.794) 
2.79 
(.622) 
2.72 
(.668) 
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with 2.32 
(.676) 
2.56 
(.710) 
2.85 
(.558) 
2.60 
(.678) 
Average 2.42 
(0.406) 
2.85 
(.469) 
2.37 
(.367) 
2.48 
(.443) 
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Table 5 demonstrates the mean of the questions about trust in each country, and the 
corresponding standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Trust in relatives and neighbors 
is higher than for institutions and the media in all countries. This result is aligned with the study 
of van Staveren and Knorringa (2007) on different types of trust relationships. Conversely, trust 
in parliaments and political parties are the lowest in all three countries. On average, the people 
in Singapore exhibit the highest level of overall trust, compared to the people in Taiwan and 
Korea. 
 
2. Three domains of trust: factor analysis [Hypothesis 1] 
Analysis 
This study performs a factor analysis of the entire samples and tries to extract three domains 
of trust. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.849 as shown in Table 6, 
which is close to one. Bartlett’s test also has a p-value of 0.00. Hence, Bartlett’s null 
hypothesis (i.e., its correlation matrix is identity matrix) is rejected. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the results are meaningful.  
 
 
 
Table 7 shows the communalities of the result. As there are no small extraction communalities 
less than 0.1, all questionnaires can be applied to the following factor analysis. 
 
Table 6. KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.849 
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Bartlett's Test of Sphericity df 91 (p=.000) 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Communalities (Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring) 
Questionnaire Initial Extraction 
Q07: Trust in - The President .503 .459 
Q08: Trust in - The courts .546 .581 
Q09: Trust in - The national government .633 .681 
Q10: Trust in - Political parties .600 .560 
Q11: Trust in - Parliament .585 .533 
Q12: Trust in - Civil service .488 .509 
Q13: Trust in - The military .500 .444 
Q14: Trust in - The police .485 .417 
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers .616 .744 
Q17: Trust in - Television .611 .799 
Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy? .212 .256 
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives .302 .364 
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors .415 .647 
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with .312 .393 
 
Table 8. Total Variance Explained (Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring) 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sum of  
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sum of  
Squared Loadings 
Total % of 
Var. 
Cummul
. % 
Total % of 
Var. 
Cummul
. % 
Total % of 
Var. 
Cummul
. % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5.249 
1.998 
1.386 
.916 
37.491 
14.271 
9.903 
6.546 
37.491 
51.762 
61.664 
68.210 
4.802 
1.466 
1.119 
34.299 
10.469 
7.993 
34.299 
44.768 
52.760 
4.097 
1.700 
1.590 
29.263 
12.141 
11.356 
29.263 
41.404 
52.760 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
.757 
.740 
.562 
.459 
.437 
.378 
.353 
.284 
.257 
.224 
5.409 
5.284 
4.012 
3.279 
3.124 
2.701 
2.518 
2.029 
1.835 
1.597 
73.620 
78.904 
82.916 
86.195 
89.320 
92.020 
94.539 
96.568 
98.403 
100.000 
Figure 2. Scree plot 
 
Table 8 and the scree plot in Figure 2 validate that 14 questions can be divided into three different 
factors, namely, F1, F2, and F3. Also, Table 8 shows that the rotated sum of F1, F2, and F3 
structures explain approximately 53% of the variance. 
Table 9. Rotated Factor Matrix and Three types of Trust 
Questionnaire Factors Rotated Factors Domains 
of Trust F1' F2' F3' F1 F2 F3 
Q07: Trust in - The President 
Q08: Trust in - The courts 
Q09: Trust in - The national government 
Q10: Trust in - Political parties 
Q11: Trust in - Parliament 
Q12: Trust in - Civil service 
Q13: Trust in - The military 
Q14: Trust in - The police 
.666 
.731 
.787 
.727 
.690 
.703 
.660 
.644 
-.093 
-.150 
-.087 
-.083 
-.071 
-.040 
-.042 
-.007 
-.083 
-.153 
-.233 
-.158 
-.227 
-.118 
-.082 
-.052 
.649 
.747 
.815 
.731 
.722 
.685 
.633 
.599 
.081 
.035 
.103 
.098 
.093 
.137 
.127 
.160 
.177 
.147 
.081 
.128 
.049 
.148 
.165 
.181 
F1. 
Institutiona
l Trust 
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Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy? 
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives 
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors 
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with 
.259 
.276 
.296 
.201 
.432 
.526 
.736 
.591 
.043 
.104 
.135 
-.058 
.125 
.097 
.059 
.080 
.488 
.588 
.798 
.614 
.046 
.089 
.084 
-.098 
F2. 
Interperson
al Trust 
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers 
Q17: Trust in - Television 
.547 
.535 
-.171 
-.168 
.644 
.696 
.275 
.243 
.048 
.053 
.816 
.859 
F3. Trust in 
the Media 
The rotated factor matrix in Table 9 clearly displays the differences in the questionnaires 
affected by three factors. Therefore, in this study, the questionnaires are categorized into three 
types depending on the factors: F1. Institutional trust; F2. Interpersonal trust; F3. Trust in the 
media. It should be noted that as the factors are rotated to maximize the variance, it is obvious 
that those factors are mutually independent and normally distributed.  
Findings 
Table 10. Factor scores in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
Domain of Trust Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
F1. Institutional trust -.269 
(.777) 
1.050 
(.853) 
-.260 
(.740) 
F2. Interpersonal trust -.115 
(.851) 
-.212 
(1.004) 
.194 
(.779) 
F3. Trust in the media .376 
(.878) 
-.007 
(.919) 
-.312 
(.829) 
 
Consequently, the factor scores of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, derived from the factor 
matrix previously discussed, are compared. Table 10 shows the mean of three factor scores in 
each country, and the corresponding standard deviations are given in the parentheses. 
Interestingly, all three domains of trust have different patterns in each country. Specifically, 
among the three types of trust, institutional trust (F1) is the highest in Singapore above 
interpersonal trust and trust in the media, while in Taiwan it is interpersonal trust (F2), and in 
Korea, trust in the media (F3) is the highest. On the contrary, the level of institutional trust (F1) 
is the lowest among the other factors in Korea, while in Singapore, it is interpersonal trust (F2) 
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that scores the lowest level. Specifically, in Singapore, people tend to trust institutions more 
than people, yet in Taiwan, the level of interpersonal trust is higher than that of television and 
the press, while in Korea, people consider the media to be the most trustworthy above 
institutions and other people. Accordingly, this distinct result also reconfirms mutually 
independent factor scores. 
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C. Dependent Variables: Citizenship 
1. Descriptive analysis in each country 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires on citizenship in each country 
Questionnaire Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
Total 
(N=2473) 
Q33. Did you vote in the last national election? (Y/N) 774 
(85.2%) 
437 
(89.2%) 
886 
(82.4%) 
2097 
(84.8%) 
Q35. Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally? 
(Y/N) 
137 
(15.1%) 
114 
(23.3%) 
121 
(11.3%) 
372 
(15.0%) 
Q36. Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain 
candidate or party? (Y/N) 
90 
(9.9%) 
67 
(13.7%) 
145 
(13.5%) 
302 
(12.2%) 
Q37. Did you do anything else to help out or work for 
a party or candidate? (Y/N) 
26 
(2.9%) 
33 
(6.7%) 
37 
(3.4%) 
98 
(3.9%) 
Q74. Whether you personally have ever got together 
with others to try to resolve local problems (4 scales) 
1.56 
(.726) 
1.97 
(.713) 
1.87 
(.862) 
1.78 
(.803) 
Q75. Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a 
petition (4 scales) 
1.57 
(.760) 
1.86 
(.749) 
1.83 
(.846) 
1.74 
(.806) 
Q76. Attended a demonstration or protest march (4 
scale) 
1.37 
(.565) 
1.53 
(.668) 
1.55 
(.851) 
1.48 
(.726) 
Q84. Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of 
government (4 scales) 
2.19 
(.793) 
3.12 
(.506) 
2.31 
(.664) 
2.43 
(.770) 
Q151. Our country should defend our way of life 
instead of becoming more and more like other 
countries. (4 scale) 
2.48 
(.723) 
1.96 
(.597) 
1.98 
(.519) 
2.16 
(.662) 
Q161. How proud are you to be a citizen of the country? 
(4 scale) 
2.83 
(.675) 
3.22 
(.598) 
3.08 
(.633) 
3.02 
(.660) 
Q150. How closely do you follow major events in 
foreign countries/ the world? (5 scale) 
3.36 
(.853) 
3.44 
(.934) 
3.68 
(.919) 
3.52 
(.911) 
Q154. "Economic growth and creating jobs should be 
the top priority" vs. "Protecting the environment should 
be given priority" (Choose 1) 
1.39 
(.488) 
1.51 
(.500) 
1.71 
(.452) 
1.55 
(.497) 
Q162. Given the chance, how willing would you be to 
go and live in another country (4 scales) 
2.31 
(.890) 
2.58 
(.828) 
2.37 
(.779) 
2.39 
(.836) 
Q153. Do you think the government should increase or 
decrease the inflow of foreign immigrants into the 
country? (4 scales) 
2.61 
(.775) 
2.29 
(.759) 
2.54 
(.746) 
2.51 
(.767) 
Table 11 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the questionnaires about citizenship in each 
country. The table includes the counts of “Yes” and their ratio (in parentheses) for the questions 
with “Yes or No” type answers. On the other hand, for questions with two, four, or five-point 
scales, the table shows their mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). In the following 
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sections, the results are discussed in detail, and five facets of citizenship are defined as the 
dependent variables of this study. 
 
2. Five facets of citizenship  
Analysis 
Electoral participation 
The dependent variable, “electoral participation” (Y1) is set based on the answers to Q33.  
Active participation 
To identify the relationships between the factors, chi-square (parametric) and Cramer's V (non-
parametric) tests are conducted on Q35, Q36, and Q37 as seen in Table 12. Both test results 
support that the answers on Q35, Q36, and Q37 are closely related. In addition, “Yes” or “No” 
questions are considered dummy variables where “1” denotes “Yes” and “0” denotes “No.” 
Also, the sum of all three answers is set as variable Y2a that corresponds to “Political 
Participation.”   
Table 12. Chi-square and Cramer's V tests on Q35, Q36, and Q37 
Chi-square 
(Sig.) 
Q35 Q36 Q37  Cramer's V 
(Sig.) 
Q35 Q36 Q37 
Q35 1 - -  Q35 1 - - 
Q36 367.405** 
(.000) 
1 -  Q36 .385** 
(.000) 
1 - 
Q37 234.262** 
(.000) 
198.177** 
(.000) 
1  Q37 .308** 
(.000) 
.283** 
(.000) 
1 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
Further, Q74, Q75, Q76, which indicate how actively citizens participate in social issues, are 
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expected to measure the level of “social participation” (Y2b). In order to evaluate the level of 
“social participation” and the previously defined “political participation,” Pearson's rho and 
Kendal's tau_b are tested as shown in Table 13. Consequently, the result shows a strong and 
positive relationship among the answers to these questions. Therefore, a second dependent 
variable “active participation” (Y2) is constructed by taking the mean values of “political 
participation” and “social participation.” 
 
Table 13. Pearson's rho and Kendall's tau_b on Q74, Q75, and Q76 
Pearson's 
rho 
(Sig.) 
Y2a Q74 Q75 Q76  Kendall's 
tau_b 
(Sig.) 
Y2a Q74 Q75 Q76 
Y2a 1 - - -  Y2a 1 - - - 
Q74 .247** 
(.000) 
1 - -  Q74 .200** 
(.000) 
1 - - 
Q75 .265** 
(.000) 
.551** 
(.000) 
1 -  Q75 .216** 
(.000) 
.584** 
(.000) 
1 - 
Q76 .269** 
(.000) 
.344** 
(.000) 
.521** 
(.000) 
1  Q76 .226** 
(.000) 
.376** 
(.000) 
.510** 
(.000) 
1 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
 
National value 
By averaging the answers to the following questions, how proud the citizens are of (Q84) the 
national system, (Q161) the country, and how (Q151) national identity is perceived, the third 
dependent variable “national value” (Y3) is defined. Table 14 demonstrates Pearson’s rho and 
Kendall’s tau_b result for those questionnaires that show a relatively strong and positive 
relationship. 
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Table 14. Pearson's rho and Kendall's tau_b on Q84, Q151, and Q161 
Pearson's 
rho 
(Sig.) 
Q84 Q151 Q161  Kendall's 
tau_b 
(Sig.) 
Q84 Q151 Q161 
Q84 1 - -  Q84 1 - - 
Q151 .186** 
(.000) 
1 -  Q151 .168** 
(.000) 
1 - 
Q161 .295** 
(.000) 
.173** 
(.000) 
1  Q161 .254** 
(.000) 
.161** 
(.000) 
1 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
Cosmopolitan value 
The fourth dependent variable, “cosmopolitan value” (Y4) is derived from (Q150) people’s 
interest in global issues, (Q162) willingness to live abroad, and (Q154) the priority given to 
environmental protection over economic development. The results in Table 15 demonstrate that 
although the answers to those questions are weakly related, they are in a positive direction. 
Accordingly, the “cosmopolitan value” (Y4) is measured as a weighted sum of Q150, Q162, 
and Q154, standardized to four scales. 
Table 15. Pearson's rho and Kendall's tau_b on Q150, Q165, and Q162 
Pearson's 
rho 
(Sig.) 
Q150 Q162 Q154  Kendall's 
tau_b 
(Sig.) 
Q150 Q162 Q154 
Q150 1 - -  Q84 1 - - 
Q162 .063** 
(.002) 
1 -  Q162 .057** 
(.003) 
1 - 
Q154 .105** 
(.000) 
.104** 
(.000) 
1  Q154 .107** 
(.000) 
.074** 
(.000) 
1 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
Immigration  
Lastly, as a fifth dependent variable, tolerance towards “immigration” (Y5) is set from answers 
to Q153.  
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Findings 
According to the answers to Q33, it can be seen that in all three countries most people vote in 
the national election. It is also shown that electoral participation (Y1) in the three countries 
score similarly. However, the results of the survey show that for all three nations, people rarely 
participate in campaign meetings (Q35), persuade others to vote (Q36), or work for a party 
(Q37). For active participation (Y2), it is shown that people in Korea are not willing to 
participate in political and social activities compared with people in Singapore and Taiwan. 
The citizens in Singapore are very proud of their own country and system as measured by 
national value (Y3), whereas the people in Taiwan score high in cosmopolitan value (Y4). It is 
also noted that the people of Korea are neither proud of their country (Y3), nor interested in 
global issues (Y4). Finally, in Korea, tolerance toward immigration (Y5) is nearly equivalent 
to that of Taiwan, but the people of Singapore are relatively close to immigrants. Table 16 
summarizes the five dependent variables described above. 
Table 16. Five dependent variables on citizenship in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
Total 
(N=2473) 
Y1: Electoral participation .85 
(.355) 
.89 
(.311) 
.82 
(.381) 
.85 
(.359) 
Y2: Active participation 1.496 
(.588) 
1.780 
(.579) 
1.702 
(.616) 
1.642 
(.609) 
Y3: National value 2.515 
(.495) 
3.126 
(.386) 
2.805 
(.387) 
2.762 
(.484) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value 2.416 
(.628) 
2.643 
(.652) 
2.841 
(.619) 
2.646 
(.657) 
Y5: Immigration 2.607 
(.775) 
2.286 
(.759) 
2.527 
(.748) 
2.510 
(.767) 
 
D. Independent and Dependent Variables Affected by Control Variables 
In this section, the independent and dependent variables derived from Section IV.B and Section 
IV.C are compared, in relation to the control variables. As briefly discussed in Section IV.A, 
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five control variables constitute of the socioeconomic profiles: gender, age, level of education, 
household economy, and use of the Internet. In the following sections, this study aims to define 
the impact of control variables on independent and dependent variables in the different context 
of each country. 
It should be noted that different analytical tests are applied. For instance, as gender is a dummy 
variable with two entries, ANOVA tests are used on independent and dependent variables to 
compare the difference. In Table 4 of Section IV.A, it is also shown that household economy 
roughly follows a normal distribution. Then, Pearson’s rho is calculated to define the 
relationship of household economy to the independent and dependent variables. Lastly, 
Kendall’s test is used to identify the relationship of the conditional variables that are normally 
distributed, such as age, level of education, and use of the Internet. 
 
1. Gender 
Table 17. p-values of ANOVA tests for independent and dependent variables against gender 
Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
F1. Institutional trust .383 
(F=.762) 
.834 
(F=.044) 
.418 
(F=.658) 
F2. Interpersonal trust .133 
(F=2.261) 
.407 
(S=.687) 
.910 
(F=.013) 
F3. Trust in the media .634 
(F=.227) 
.314 
(F=1.017) 
.951 
(F=.004) 
Y1: Electoral participation .360 
(F=.838) 
.626 
(F=.237) 
.201 
(F=1.639) 
Y2: Active participation .000** 
(F=13.628) 
.015 
(F=5.973) 
.540 
(F=.375) 
Y3: National value .738 
(F=.112) 
.623 
(F=.242) 
.691 
(F=.158) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value .551 
(F=.356) 
.968 
(F=.002) 
.582 
(F=303) 
Y5: Immigration .440 
(F=.596) 
.166 
(F=1.921) 
.000** 
(F=14.249) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
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Table 17, Levene’s Test denotes that the variances of all independent and dependent variables 
are equal to the control variable, “genders” in all countries. Therefore, one-way ANOVA can 
test the difference of the means. The significance levels of one-way ANOVA for almost all 
variables are also above .05 in all countries. Two exceptions are electoral participation (Y1) in 
Korea (p-value = .000) and immigration (Y5) in Taiwan (p-value = .000), which state a 
statistically significant difference. Table 4 in Section IV.A shows that in Korea, men are more 
likely to vote, and in Taiwan, men are more likely to be open to immigrants, compared to 
women. Except for those two cases, there is no gender difference on the variables.   
 
2. Age [Hypothesis 4] 
Table 18. Kendall's tau_b values of independent and dependent variables against age 
Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
F1. Institutional trust .080*** 
(p=.001) 
.109*** 
(p=.001) 
.044* 
(p=.049) 
F2. Interpersonal trust .017 
(p=.498) 
-.048 
(p=.149) 
.036 
(p=.107) 
F3. Trust in the media .073** 
(p=.003) 
.077* 
(p=.020) 
.068** 
(p=.003) 
Y1: Electoral participation .267** 
(p=.000) 
.154** 
(p=.000) 
.069 
(p=.089) 
Y2: Active participation .134** 
(p=.000) 
.031 
(p=.202) 
-.079* 
(p=.028) 
Y3: National value .165** 
(p=.000) 
.137** 
(p=.000) 
.082* 
(p=.028) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value -.135** 
(.000) 
-.205** 
(p=.000) 
-.106** 
(p=.002) 
Y5: Immigration -.033 
(.246) 
-.124** 
(p=.000) 
.004 
(p=.919) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
The results of Kendall’s non-parametric correlation tests only show positive correlations, as 
seen in Table 18. In general, the higher the age, the higher the level of trust in an institution (F1) 
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and the media (F3), when compared to the younger generation. However, there is no correlation 
observed between age and interpersonal trust (F2). In addition, there is a strong and positive 
correlation between age and electoral participation (Y1) in Korea and Singapore, but not in 
Taiwan. With regard to active participation (Y2), age has a positive correlation in Korea, but 
in Taiwan, it is negatively correlated, whereas no meaningful correlation is seen in Singapore. 
In commonly for all three countries, age shows a positive relationship for national value (Y3), 
but in contrast, it has a negative relationship with cosmopolitan value (Y4). Compared to the 
cosmopolitan value (Y4) result, in Korea and Taiwan, no negative correlation is seen between 
age and immigration (Y5). However, in Singapore; there is a statistically significant and 
negative correlation. 
 
3. Level of education [Hypothesis 6] 
Table 19. Kendall's tau_b values of independent and dependent variables against level of education 
Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
F1. Institutional trust -.051 
(p=.055) 
-.051 
(p=.149) 
-.009 
(p=.701) 
F2. Interpersonal trust .003 
(p=.902) 
.003 
(p=.933) 
.019 
(p=.433) 
F3. Trust in the media -.078** 
(p=.004) 
-.136** 
(p=.000) 
-.161** 
(p=.000) 
Y1: Electoral participation -.140** 
(p=.000) 
-.044 
(p=.302) 
.001 
(p=.960) 
Y2: Active participation -.016 
(p=.586) 
.162** 
(p=.000) 
.093** 
(p=.000) 
Y3: National value -.119** 
(p=.000) 
-.008 
(p=.837) 
-.062* 
(p=.017) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value .149** 
(p=.000) 
.118** 
(p=.001) 
.289** 
(p=.000) 
Y5: Immigration .047 
(p=.124) 
.080* 
(p=.049) 
.183** 
(p=.000) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
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As shown in Table 19, there is no correlation between the level of education and institutional 
trust (F1) and interpersonal trust (F2). One noteworthy result is the negative correlation 
between the level of education and trust in the media (F3) in all three countries. There is no 
common pattern in the relationship between the level of education and the dependent variables, 
with the exception of cosmopolitan value (Y4), which has a positive correlation with the level 
of education in all countries. Presumably, more educated citizens are likely to be exposed to 
foreign people and cultures more frequently. In the case of Singapore and Taiwan, active 
participation (Y2) and immigration (Y5) also show a weak but positive correlation with the 
level of education. Meanwhile, electoral participation (Y1) and national value (Y3) in Korea 
have a negative correlation with the level of education. 
 
4. Household economy [Hypothesis 5] 
Table 20. Pearson's rho values of independent and dependent variables against household economy 
Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
F1. Institutional trust .104** 
(p=.002) 
.192** 
(p=.000) 
.120** 
(p=.000) 
F2. Interpersonal trust .122** 
(p=.000) 
.358** 
(p=.000) 
.144** 
(p=.000) 
F3. Trust in the media .108** 
(p=.001) 
.191** 
(p=.000) 
-.024 
(p=.431) 
Y1: Electoral participation .070* 
(p=.036) 
-.097* 
(p=.032) 
.102** 
(p=.001) 
Y2: Active participation -.092** 
(p=.005) 
.035 
(p=.438) 
.060 
(p=.051) 
Y3: National value .077** 
(p=.020) 
.147** 
(p=.001) 
.127** 
(p=.000) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value -.030 
(p=.370) 
.165** 
(p=.000) 
.090** 
(p=.003) 
Y5: Immigration .035 
(p=.294) 
.211** 
(p=.000) 
.074** 
(p=.003) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
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In Table 20, high positive correlations are seen between household economy and institutional 
trust (F1) and also with interpersonal trust (F2), commonly for all three countries. In particular, 
in Singapore, where relatively low interpersonal trust exists, we observe a strong positive 
correlation between household economy and interpersonal trust (F2). Trust in the media (F3) 
also has a positive correlation with household economy in both Korea and Singapore, but it 
does not have any influence in Taiwan. Electoral participation (Y1) is positively associated 
with household economy in Korea and Taiwan, while it is negatively related in Singapore. With 
regard to the relationship between economic satisfaction and active participation (Y2), a weak 
and negative correlation is observed in Korea, while there is no correlation in Singapore and 
Taiwan. It is also verified that national value (Y3) has a positive relationship with household 
economy in all countries. Both cosmopolitan value (Y4) and Immigration (Y5) have a 
relatively strong correlation with household economy in Singapore and only a weak correlation 
in Taiwan. 
 
5. Use of the Internet [Hypothesis 6] 
Table 21. Kendall's tau_b values of independent and dependent variables against use of the Internet 
Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
F1. Institutional trust -.076** 
(p=.002) 
-.114** 
(p=.001) 
-.076** 
(p=.002) 
F2. Interpersonal trust -.029 
(p=.237) 
-.080* 
(p=.020) 
-.029 
(p=.237) 
F3. Trust in the media -.088** 
(p=.000) 
-.135** 
(p=.000) 
-.088** 
(p=.000) 
Y1: Electoral participation -.107** 
(p=.000) 
-.127** 
(p=.003) 
-.054 
(p=.052) 
Y2: Active participation -.055* 
(p=.041) 
.101** 
(p=.007) 
.048 
(p=.053) 
Y3: National value -.137** 
(p=.000) 
-.026 
(p=.508) 
-.106** 
(p=.000) 
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Variable Korea 
(N=908) 
Singapore 
(N=490) 
Taiwan 
(N=1075) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value .123** 
(p=.000) 
.140** 
(p=.000) 
.264** 
(p=.000) 
Y5: Immigration .038 
(p=.176) 
-.003 
(p=.943) 
.129** 
(p=.000) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
The use of the Internet clearly has a negative impact on institutional trust (F1) and trust in the 
media (F3) in all countries, as shown in Table 21. However, interpersonal trust (F2) is not 
affected by the frequent use of the Internet. Electoral Participation (Y1) and Active 
Participation (Y2) in Korea are likely to decline with frequent use of the Internet. In Singapore, 
Electoral Participation (Y1) shows a negative correlation with Internet use but a positive 
correlation with Active Participation (Y2). Admittedly, use of the Internet negatively affects 
National Value (Y3) in all countries, but it is not statistically significant in Singapore. The only 
variable that has a positive correlation with use of the Internet commonly for all countries is 
the Cosmopolitan Value (Y4). Use of the Internet also affects Immigration (Y5) in Taiwan in a 
positive manner.  
 
E. Independent and Dependent Variables: Regression Models [Hypotheses 1, 2, 3] 
The relationships between independent and dependent variables are measured by using binary 
logistic regression for Y1, which has a binary output, and multiple linear regression for the 
others (i.e., Y2, Y3, Y4, and Y5). The samples are based on nationality for the study of the 
relationships between independent and dependent variables. In the following sections, the 
coefficients (B) derived from binary logistic regression and multiple linear regression of the 
respective countries are summarized, along with the p-values shown in parentheses. 
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1. Korea 
Table 22: Coefficients of Binary Logistic Regression (Y1) and Multiple Linear Regression (Y2 to Y5) in Korea 
Variable Constant F1. Institutional 
trust 
F2. Interpersonal 
trust 
F3. Trust in  
Media 
Y1: Electoral participation 
(R2=.004) 
1.764** 
(.000) 
.121 
(.336) 
.099 
(.375) 
.121 
(.256) 
Y2: Active participation 
(R2=.006) 
1.517** 
(.000) 
.055 
(.033) 
-.006 
(.799) 
-.021 
(.350) 
Y3: National value 
(R2=.152) 
2.572** 
(.000) 
.206** 
(.000) 
.098** 
(.000) 
.021 
(.221) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value 
(R2=.018) 
2.424** 
(.000) 
-.057 
(.037) 
.081* 
(.001) 
-.037 
(.119) 
Y5: Immigration 
(R2=.006) 
2.605** 
(.000) 
.020 
(.546) 
.050 
(.105) 
.035 
(.236) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
The abovementioned regression models yield the following equations for independent 
variables and dependent variables in Korea. 
Y1_Korea = 1.764 + .121*F1 + .099*F2 + .121*F3 
Y2_Korea = 1.517 + .055*F1 – .006*F2 – .021*F3 
Y3_Korea = 2.572 + .206*F1 + .098*F2 + .021*F3 
Y4_Korea = 2.424 – .057*F1 + .081*F2 – .037*F3 
Y5_Korea = 2.605 + .020*F1 + .050*F2 + .035*F3 
Electoral participation (Y1), active participation (Y2), and immigration (Y5) in Korea are 
dominated by the constant as none of the coefficients are statistically significant and their R-
square in the regression model is small. Therefore, this study claims that electoral participation 
(Y1), active participation (Y2), and immigration (Y5) are not correlated with institutional trust 
(F1), interpersonal trust (F2), or trust in the media (F3) in Korea. However, national value (Y3) 
is well explained (R2 = .152) with institutional trust (F1) and interpersonal trust (F2), where 
both of the independent variables have positive coefficients. Cosmopolitan value (Y4) is 
mainly led by the interpersonal trust (F2) in a positive direction. It is also notable that trust in 
the media (F3) does not affect any of the dependent variables in Korea. 
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2. Singapore 
Table 23. Coefficients of Binary Logistic Regression (Y1) and Multiple Linear Regression (Y2 to Y5) in Singapore 
Variable Constant F1. Institutional 
trust 
F2. Interpersonal 
trust 
F3. Trust in  
Media 
Y1: Electoral participation 
(R2=.012) 
1.854** 
(.000) 
.239 
(.185) 
-.235 
(.122) 
-.234 
(.161) 
Y2: Active participation 
(R2=.005) 
1.816** 
(.000) 
-.029 
(.362) 
.027 
(.303) 
-.025 
(.396) 
Y3: National value 
(R2=.114) 
2.993** 
(.000) 
.135** 
(.000) 
.047* 
(.005) 
.003 
(.875) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value 
(R2=.018) 
2.735** 
(.000) 
-.075 
(.035) 
.063 
(.035) 
-.030 
(.367) 
Y5: Immigration 
(R2=.034) 
2.252** 
(.000) 
.061 
(.136) 
.107* 
(.002) 
.043 
(.261) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
The abovementioned regression models yield the following equations for independent 
variables and dependent variables in Singapore. 
Y1_Singapore = 1.854 + .239*F1 – .235*F2 – .234*F3 
Y2_Singapore = 1.816 – .029*F1 + .027*F2 – .025*F3 
Y3_Singapore = 2.993 + .135*F1 + .047*F2 + .003*F3 
Y4_Singapore = 2.735 – .075*F1 + .063*F2 – .030*F3 
Y5_Singapore = 2.252 + .061*F1 + .107*F2 + .043*F3 
Table 23 demonstrates that electoral participation (Y1), active participation (Y2), and 
cosmopolitan value (Y4) are not affected by the independent variables but are dominated by 
the constant. National value (Y3) is well explained (R2 = .114) by using institutional trust (F1) 
and interpersonal trust (F2) where both are positively correlated. The only dependent variable 
that is correlated with immigration (Y5) is interpersonal trust (F2), which has a positive 
correlation. It is worth mentioning that trust in the media (F3) does not affect the dependent 
variables, and this same observation is made in the case of Korea.  
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3. Taiwan 
Table 24. Coefficients of Binary Logistic Regression (Y1) and Multiple Linear Regression (Y2 to Y5) in Taiwan 
Variable Constant F1. Institutional 
trust 
F2. Interpersonal 
trust 
F3. Trust in  
Media 
Y1: Electoral participation 
(R2=.013) 
1.540** 
(.000) 
.115 
(.299) 
.347** 
(.001) 
.014 
(.886) 
Y2: Active participation 
(R2=.012) 
1.669** 
(.000) 
-.026 
(.312) 
.079** 
(.001) 
-.035 
(.124) 
Y3: National value 
(R2=.171) 
2.853** 
(.000) 
.194** 
(.000) 
.062** 
(.000) 
.029 
(.024) 
Y4: Cosmopolitan value 
(R2=.027) 
2.783** 
(.000) 
-.078* 
(.002) 
.024 
(.308) 
-.104** 
(.000) 
Y5: Immigration 
(R2=.010) 
2.532** 
(.000) 
.068 
(.028) 
.023 
(.429) 
-.057 
(.037) 
**Significant at 99%, *Significant at 95% 
The abovementioned regression models yield the following equations for independent 
variables and dependent variables in Taiwan. 
Y1_Taiwan = 1.540 + .115*F1 + .347*F2 + .014*F3 
Y2_Taiwan = 1.669 – .026*F1 + .079*F2 – .035*F3 
Y3_Taiwan = 2.853 + .194*F1 + .062*F2 + .029*F3 
Y4_Taiwan = 2.783 – .078*F1 + .024*F2 – .104*F3 
Y5_Taiwan = 2.532 + .068*F1 + .023*F2 – .057*F3 
In the case of Taiwan, electoral participation (Y1) and active participation (Y2) can roughly be 
derived from interpersonal trust (F2), where electoral participation (Y1) is more closely related 
to interpersonal trust (F2) with a positive correlation, compared to the weak correlation of 
active participation (Y2). National value (Y3) is explained by both institutional trust (F1) and 
interpersonal trust (F2). An interesting result comes from cosmopolitan value (Y4), which has 
a negative relationship with both institutional trust (F1) and trust in the media (F3). Lastly, 
none of the independent variables well describe immigration (Y5). 
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F. Hypotheses Test Results and Summary of Findings 
Table 25. Summary of hypothesis test result 
Finding Hypothesis Summary of Hypotheses test result Result 
IV-B-2, 
IV-E-1,2,3 
H1 Interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and trust in the 
media affect individual’s citizenship in a distinct manner.  
Supported 
IV-E-3 H2 Institutional trust and trust in the media are positively 
related to national citizenship (electoral participation, 
political and social participation, national value). 
Rejected* 
IV-E-1,2 H3 Interpersonal trust positively influences citizenships 
related to globalization (cosmopolitan value and tolerance 
for immigrant population). 
Partially 
supported* 
IV-D-2 H4 All three countries will show considerable differences in 
age-based trust and citizenship, given the fact that all 
three countries have experienced rapid socioeconomic 
transitions over the last century. 
Supported 
IV-D-4 H5 Level of trust is positively related to the level of overall 
household economy satisfaction. 
Supported 
IV-D-3,5 H6 Level of education and use of the Internet positively 
influence citizenship related to globalization 
(cosmopolitan value and tolerance towards immigrants) 
Partially 
supported* 
Notes 1) H2: The correlation is found only between institutional trust (F1) and national value (Y3). 
2) H3: Interpersonal trust (F2) is positively related to cosmopolitan value (Y4) in Korea and 
tolerance for immigration (Y5) in Singapore. 
3) H6: A high correlation is found in all three countries between cosmopolitan value (Y4) and 
both the level of education and the use of the Internet. Besides, unlike Singapore and Taiwan, the 
level of education and the use of the Internet in Korea have no significant impact on the 
perception of immigration (Y5). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Three domains of trust 
The results of the analysis show that the three countries have different trust patterns. 
Singaporeans are more trusting, showing a relatively high level of institutional, media, and 
interpersonal trust, compared to the other two countries. Among the other types of trust, 
Singaporeans have the highest trust in government, while the level of interpersonal trust is the 
lowest among the factors. Korea, however, has the lowest average trust among the three 
countries. In particular, institutional trust is lowest and interpersonal trust is not high either, 
while trust in the media is relatively higher than the other factors. Taiwan is known to be the 
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country with the highest level of freedom of the press among the group (Freedom House 2016). 
However, in Taiwan, the media seems to receive very low trust from the citizens because trust 
in the media is not only the lowest among the three types of trust but also among the countries 
in the group. Moreover, in contrast to Singapore, interpersonal trust is the highest in Taiwan. 
This outcome indicates that there is a contrasting trend among the three types of trust in relation 
to different national characteristics. Furthermore, the results of the statistical analysis confirm 
that the three types of trust are all mutually distinct.  
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Trust and citizenship 
Following the above analysis, it is also confirmed that interpersonal trust and institutional trust 
are positively correlated with the dependent variable “national value” in all three countries. 
However, it is shown in both Korea and Singapore that all three types of trusts have no 
correlation with the level of commitment to voting (electoral participation) and active 
participation. Unlike the two other countries, in Taiwan, it was demonstrated that trust among 
individuals, increases the level of voting, and active participation. In addition, it is shown that 
interpersonal trust has a positive relationship with cosmopolitan value in Korea and in 
Singapore with tolerance toward immigration. Furthermore, it is confirmed that trust in the 
media does not contribute to revitalizing citizenship. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Age differences 
It is also found that age matters for both trust building and citizenship. For all three countries, 
a higher age leads to high trust in institutions and the media, greater commitment to voting, 
and higher national value. It is plausible that as age increases, a more tolerant attitude is likely. 
By contrast, age and “cosmopolitan value” are inversely correlated in all three countries, and 
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as age increases, global consciousness declines. This also means that the lower the age, the 
more open the attitude toward global society.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Satisfaction with the household economy 
Additionally, it was confirmed that the higher the satisfaction with the household economy, the 
higher the average level of trust and the national value. In Korea, however, financial satisfaction 
is relatively low, and this positive effect is expected to be somewhat small. Also, in Singapore 
and Taiwan, it is confirmed that there is a positive correlation between household economy and 
global attitudes, such as cosmopolitan value and tolerance towards immigrants.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Education and the Internet 
Finally, for all three countries, the higher the level of education the lower the trust in the media, 
while education contributes to building “cosmopolitan value.” Particularly in Korea, education 
has a negative correlation with the commitment to voting and national values. In other words, 
a higher level of education leads to lower voting participation and national value. Notably, in 
all three countries, trust in the institutions and media, as well as national value, decline the 
more people use the Internet. In contrast, Internet use shows a positive relationship with 
cosmopolitan value, in all three countries.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. Implications 
The purpose of this study was to empirically analyze the relationship between trust and 
citizenship in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, in the context of globalization. Accordingly, the 
elements of trust were categorized into interpersonal, institutional, and trust in the media, and 
citizenship into electoral participation, active participation, national value, cosmopolitan value, 
and tolerance for immigration. Based on existing theories and previous studies, this study 
assumed that trust, as an important element of social capital, provides a positive mechanism for 
the engagement and role of citizens in specific societies (Putnam 1993). Therefore, this study 
aimed to examine whether the different functions of trust can be applied not only to the national 
boundaries but also to global society, taking into account socio-demographic characteristics. 
Firstly, this study revealed that each of the three domains of trust, including institutional and 
individual trust, as well as trust in the media, is mutually distinct, while previous studies have 
mainly focused on general social trust and institutional trust. Particular findings of the analysis 
suggest that in Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the level of interpersonal and institutional trust is 
highly correlated with the perception of national value. Contrasting results also suggest that 
interpersonal trust is expressed in Taiwan as conventional citizenship such as voting and active 
participation, while in Korea and Singapore, this type of trust leads to an open attitude towards 
globalization and immigrant populations. This result reconfirms findings from previous studies 
that distinguish between institutional trust and interpersonal trust (Kaase 1999; Newton 1999; 
Putnam 2001; Whiteley 1999). Additionally, the result found of trust in the media not affecting 
citizenship, which is different to other types of trust, can be inversely interpreted as evidence that 
media trust itself is an independent trust type.  
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Secondly, through the analysis of the control variables and regression analysis on the independent 
and dependent variables, this study also found that national value and cosmopolitan value are 
inversely related to the age and the use of the Internet, while positive relationships are manifested 
in the satisfaction level of household economy and interpersonal trust in Korea and Singapore. 
Thus, the empirical results partially verified the claims of alternative citizenship (Armstrong 
2006a; Parekh 2003) by showing that economic satisfaction and interpersonal trust can 
concurrently enhance both national values such as patriotism and cosmopolitan attitudes towards 
other societies. 
Finally, the descriptive statistical results show that people in all three countries do not actively 
participate in social and political actions, especially when compared to their commitment to 
electoral participation, which is a basic right of all citizens in democratic societies. This result 
reaffirms the arguments of Chang and Turner (2012) that citizenship in Asia does not necessarily 
lead to active social citizenship. However, even though the three Asian countries share traits of 
the Confucian tradition, trust and citizenship appear, as stated above, in very divergent ways. 
Further, the results show that citizenship of the three countries is changing rapidly, showing a 
marked difference in the manifestation of citizenship by age groups and the level of the Internet 
use. Seemingly, the younger generations are more likely to adapt to new information and 
knowledge via the Internet. In line with Bennett’s “actualizing citizenship” theory (Bennett et al. 
2011) the younger generations in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan tend to be more open to the 
outside world, less deferential to state citizenship, and tend to form institutional trust based on 
critical judgments as “rationally acting individuals,” which is the fundamental of liberal’ 
citizenship theories (Rawls 1971; Oldfield 1990; Turner 1993). In short, since institutional trust 
is closely linked to the government’s performance and citizens’ rational assessments (Della Porta 
2000; Hetherington 1998; Pharr 2000), transparent and efficient management of institutional 
systems seems to be more important than ever to improve citizens’ support of the government.  
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B. Limitations of the Study 
Firstly, the data set obtained from the Asian Barometer Survey was crucial in conducting this 
study. However, using existing survey data also caused some limitations in establishing more 
precise and accurate questions about trust and citizenship variables. Secondly, it is beyond the 
scope of this study to examine real-world case examples that could eventually bridge the gap 
between theories and statistical analysis. Therefore, for a more rational understanding and 
accurate analysis, a study of the causes and consequences beyond the theoretical and statistical 
analyses is required. Finally, another potential problem is that the scope of this study is 
somewhat too broad. It can be pointed out that the focus of the argument is a bit blurred, by 
applying several variables in the context of three different nations. In brief, it is highly expected 
that further research will be carried out on the role of citizens in the context of globalization 
through the lens of trust-building relationships. 
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